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Abstract Developing countries need to reform legislation
to ensure the global supply firms in ready-made garment
(RMG) industry is adequately addressing obligations of
social responsibility. Literature typically focuses on
strategies for raising responsible standards in global buying
firms within the RMG industry, but fails to focus on
implementing strategies for suppliers in developing coun-
tries. This article addresses this gap by specifically focus-
ing on the RMG industry in Bangladesh, the home of the
third largest RMG supplier in the world. It concentrates on
analysing how and to what extent the law can assist in
developing social responsibility performance of the RMG
manufacturing firms in developing countries. It ultimately
concludes that a new governance approach in laws can
effectively increase the social responsibility practice stan-
dards of an industry where global buying firms are profit-
driven and governmental agencies are either inadequate or
corrupt.
Keywords Corporate social responsibility  New
governance  Ready-made garments industry  Global
buyers  Bangladesh  Global supply chain
Introduction
The ready-made garments (RMG) industry in Bangladesh
experienced the most devastating incident in its history on
April 24, 2013. Rana Plaza, an eight-storey factory building
where more than four thousand people were working, col-
lapsed and killed 1134 RMG workers (Claeson 2015; Fitch
et al. 2015; Muhammad 2014). This cast a spotlight on the
poor working conditions in RMG supply firms where mil-
lions of workers make garments for consumers worldwide.
Intense publicity, both within Bangladesh and overseas,
about this incident has been greater and more widespread
than for any other previous incident in the RMG industry
worldwide. The building, Rana Plaza, contained a bank,
shops and five garment factories1 that produced apparel for
large Western-based brands like Benetton, Walmart and
Primark (Reinecke and Donaghey 2015a; Manik et al.
2013; Passariello and Banjo 2013). Sadly, if these brands
had not been affected by the tragedy, the collapse might not
have even made international news. However, because of
this connection, the disaster has become fodder for the
perennial debate over globalization (The Economist 2013;
Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014; Nolan 2014; Perry
et al. 2015). Many North American and European human-
rights groups and labour activists claim that the Western-
based firms who source garments from overseas should be
held responsible for this disaster (Balch 2013; Burke 2014;
Carmody 2013; Kinley and Navidi 2013; Muhammad
2014; Taplin 2014; Viedrman 2014). Nonetheless, in
Bangladesh, thousands of garment workers took to the
streets and were met by police spraying rubber bullets and
teargas. These Bangladeshi protesters were not directing
their outrage at the Western-based brands or cost-conscious
consumers, but at their own failed network of governance
and RMG owners’ attitudes towards workers’ wellbeing
(Bhagwati 2014; Gomes 2013; Hasan 2013; Kanzer 2013;
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The garments industry may be global, but many argue
that the blame for this disaster should primarily be local,
apportioned to the local governance failure, corruption and
ineptitude that allowed the Rana Plaza to be illegally built
and occupied in the first place (Akhter 2014; Gomes 2013;
Reinecke and Donaghey 2015b; Rivoli 2013).2 Arguably,
factory workers at Rana Plaza should never have been
confronted with weighing their livelihood against risks to
their safety (Bacon 2013; Kazmin et al. 2013). In recent
years, numerous global standards have emerged to ‘better
manage’ concerns over worker welfare and opacity in the
global supply chain (GSC). Given that the RMG sector has
been under considerable scrutiny owing to a range of high
profile disasters, the firms operating at Rana Plaza should
have been quite familiar with social responsibility pro-
cesses. Indeed, at the very least, if they believed in the
ethos of conducting social audits appropriately, this tragic
incident may never have occurred (Foxvog and Gearhart
2013; Montopoli 2013; Nahar and Rahman 2013). The
level of commitment of the other stakeholders in the
industry is also pertinent to this incident (Elliott 2013;
Posner 2013; Yunus 2013). If all the agencies responsible
for monitoring firms’ responsibility practices were doing
their jobs effectively, the firms in this plaza would have
been less likely to neglect their responsibilities in relation
to worker safety (Kelly 2013; Rights 2014). This is also
true for most of the cases of devastating fires3 in RMG
supply firms in developing countries.
There is a pressing gap between the objectives and
commitments, and practice and outcomes, in social
responsibility regulation within the RMG supply chains
(Bearnot 2013; Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014; Nolan
2014; Polaski 2006). As such, this article assesses the
social responsibility practices of the supply firms of the
RMG industry in developing countries, using the Bangla-
desh RMG industry as an example. While in theory social
responsibility performances may provide a potential
instrument for firms (buyers and suppliers) to demonstrate
the legitimacy of their operations to stakeholders (Dupire
and M’Zali 2016; Perry et al. 2015; Soundararajan and
Brown 2014), however, in practice, these performances
may be more of a tool for securing competitive advantage
and gaining market share. With this in mind, the focus of
this article is to present an analysis of how and to what
extent a new governance (NG) approach in laws matters to
the development of these practices, particularly in the
RMG industry within developing countries.
This paper is organized as follows. First it provides an
overview of the GSC structure and offers a description of
the social responsibilities of global buyers and suppliers
within it. Second, it specifically looks at the Bangladesh
RMG industry in two steps; firstly examines the overall
responsibility practices, and secondly, assesses the social
responsibility practices of RMG supply firms. Then it
considers the NG approach to law reform and assesses its
value to supply firms in developing countries where non-
legal drivers are either inadequate or ineffective. In the fifth
part, it describes how the NG approach can be included in
laws with the aim of improving firms’ social responsibility
practices in these countries. Finally, it concludes with the
implications for theory and practice, as well as the potential
and future research direction. Although this article focuses
on Bangladesh, its principles may apply to other develop-
ing countries where the social responsibility standards of
RMG supply industries are below an acceptable standard.
Social Responsibility in the Global Supply Chain
The GSC is a quasi-hierarchical relationship between
buyers and suppliers, in which the two parties are not
joined by ownership, but are engaged in a long-term rela-
tionship. This relationship generally includes two types of
chains: buyer-driven and supplier-driven chains. Buyer-
driven chains are characteristic of labour intensive indus-
tries such as the footwear, clothing and toy industries in
developing countries (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001;
Kaplinsky and Readman 2001; Luetkenhorst 2004). Sup-
plier-driven chains refer to those industries that produce
semi-final products such as machineries, petroleum prod-
ucts, electronic parts. It is therefore important that both
2 Transparency International provides an idea regarding the overall
corruption in this country. According to this organization, Bangla-
desh’s Corruption Perceptions Index score is 26 on a scale of 0–100—
a failing grade by any measure. ‘Corruption translates into human
suffering’, writes Transparency International, a truth that is tragically
evident as the death toll continues to rise in Dhaka.
3 On 11 September 2012, a devastating fire killed 312 workers of Ali
Enterprises—a RMG firm in Karachi, Pakistan. This incident is
related to the lack of supply firms’ commitment to social responsi-
bility practice. KiK, an international retailer, was the major firm
sourcing garments from Ali Enterprise. KiK claimed that it found
deficiencies in fire protection in Ali Enterprise in 2007 and fixed this
deficiency by 2011. Also, Abdul Aziz, the owner of the factory,
claimed that the factory passed an internationally recognized safety
test just a few weeks prior to the fire. However, it was revealed that
this factory caught fire when a boiler exploded and the flames ignited
chemicals that were stored on the floor where staff were working.
Almost 400 workers were inside the factory when the blaze erupted; it
was found that at the time of this incident all the exit doors in the
factory were locked and many of the windows of the factory were
covered with iron bars, which made it difficult for workers to escape
at the time of the fire and consequently many of the deaths were
caused by suffocation. The lack of a standard social responsibility
practice was also the main reason for the tragic fire at the Kader Toy
Factory in Thailand on 10 May 1993. This incident killed 188 and
injured 469 workers, mostly women. It was found that this tragedy
occurred primarily because the exit doors of this factory were locked
and the stairwell was not well constructed. For details, see Walsh and
Greenhouse (2012) and Turner (2012).
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buyers and suppliers engage in procedures that support
socially responsible business practices.
Political pressure has made many industries attune to the
needs of the environment and society. These developments
have altered the way in which some firms attempt to meet
social responsibilities. This has resulted in a complex and
multidimensional organizational phenomenon that requires
stakeholders in the GSC pragmatically maintain social
responsibility standards (McBarnet et al. 2007; Vogel 2005).
Given this, the following sections of this part succinctly
describe social responsibility practices in theGSC framework.
Social Responsibility Practices of Global Buyers
in GSC
When considering which social responsibility practices to
include in a business structure, global buying firms are
either guided by an absolutist or relativist philosophy (Kolk
and Van Tulder 2004). According to the absolutist phi-
losophy, a firm does not differentiate in relation to wages
and working standards between home and host countries
(Blowfield 2005; Bowie 1988). In contrast, a firm that is
guided by a relativist philosophy considers the host coun-
try’s context and follows local regulations related to wages
and working conditions (Brandt 1983).4
Global buying firms generally follow the relativist phi-
losophy because it provides a cost advantage and allows
firms to claim that they are engaging in ethical standards by
simply following the host country’s wage and working
standards (Donaldson and Dunfee 1994; Hoque and Faruq
2009). In relying on this approach, these firms usually
argue that they have no right to interfere with the labour
regulations of another country, and are thus respecting the
host country’s socio-political context. In following this
approach, global buying firms can apply both defensive and
proactive strategies (Nicholls 2002). A defensive strategy
maintains the minimum legal requirements and avoids
playing a part in any policy implementation processes in
supply firms (Foster and Harney 2005). Proactive strategies
involve global buying firms participating in policy imple-
mentation processes in supply firms. Firms using defensive
strategies focus more on economic benefits, whereas firms
using proactive strategies focus on the social and envi-
ronmental sustainability of the business operations of the
supply firm, and do so by considering the impact the firm
has on the society in which the firm operates. Global
buying firms presently converge these two types of
strategies within their overall operations (Foster and Har-
ney 2005). This convergence assists them in managing
legitimate threats while maintaining a cost advantage when
sourcing from developing countries. The convergence is
reflected in the development of a ‘self-regulating’ culture
in the responsibility auditing practices of global buying
firms.
At the individual global firm level, self-regulated
responsibility is maintained through codes of conduct or
through the incorporation of multi-stakeholder initiatives
and guidelines prepared by other social or commercial
organizations (Mann et al. 2014; Plank et al. 2012). These
self-regulatory instruments can address social, environ-
mental and economic issues, and are largely focused on
sectors where brand reputation and export orientation are
vital (Amaeshi et al. 2008; Rodriguez-Garavito 2005).
Codes related to labour issues are usually associated with
the footwear, garments, sporting goods, toy and retail
sectors, whereas those related to environmental issues are
more likely to be used in industries such as oil, chemicals,
forestry and mining (O’Rourke 2003; Utting 2005). The
world’s largest global buying firms have taken the lead in
adopting codes, and in doing so, have applied pressure on
supply firms to be socially responsible; which has pro-
vided buying firms with the ability to claim legitimacy of
their operations in host countries (Kaptein 2004; Levis
2006).
While global buying firms may require supply firms
follow socially responsible standards set by codes, com-
pliance is verified through social audits. The rise of social
auditing is closely related to the development of the cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR) phenomenon that has
appeared in the GSC in recent years (Baron 2001; Davis
2005; Dupire and M’Zali 2016). Carroll and Beiler (1975)
defined social audits as an attempt to measure, monitor and
evaluate the organization’s non-financial performance with
respect to its social policies and objectives. In a similar
way, Owen et al. (2000) defines social auditing as the
process by which an organization determines its impacts on
society, and then measures and reports this to the wider
community. Such auditing is ‘‘intended for both internal
4 The core of the relativist philosophy is that a point in a concept is
not an absolute truth or a point in a concept cannot claim absolute
validity, but it has a relative and subjective value according to
differences in perception and consideration (Baghramian and Carter
2016). Two of the main streams of this philosophy are (a) ethical
relativism and (b) cultural relativism. Ethical relativism stresses that
the moral principles and ethics do not have any absolute validity; they
are regarded as applicable in only limited contexts (Velasquez et al.
2016). This paper focuses on ‘cultural relativism’ that global buyers
follows while sourcing from developing countries. This ‘relativism’
philosophy stresses that an individual person’s beliefs and activities
should be understood by others in terms of that individual’s own
culture (Klein 1977; Gonzalez-Padron et al. 2008; Sobczak 2006). In
other words, the code of conduct and strategies of a global buyer
should be practical and compliant with the culture of the host country
(Winstanley et al. 2002). Some scholars argue that the use of this
philosophy allows global buyers to undermine the core of CSR and
avoid universal moral rules when making ethical judgements in least
developed host countries (Logsdon and Wood 2002; Singhapakdi
et al. 1994; Smeltzer and Jennings 1998).
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managerial and external responsibility purposes, and is an
outgrowth of changing values that have led society to
redefine the notion of a firm’s social responsibility’’ (Batra
1996, p 37).
Social audits are conducted by internal or external audit
teams and might be undertaken voluntarily, or as a required
part of a supply agreement (Gray 2000, 2001). This
auditing process should be based on formal standards of
social and environmental monitoring and should be relat-
able to financial auditing processes (Graham and Woods
2006). This is vital, as it maintains the integrity of the audit
by removing the auditors’ discretion, which in turn rein-
forces the claim of independence (OECD 2001).
Unfortunately global buying firms tend to only rely on
external auditors when the firm faces major threats as a
result of media accusations and/or sustained NGO cam-
paigns, for example, in relation to the use of child labour,
or any other inappropriate supplier behaviour (Deegan and
Islam 2012). The integrity of the process can further be
undermined if the firm being audited is the firm responsible
for paying the auditors. PricewaterhouseCoopers examined
the impact of these situations when it studied the labour
standards in China and Korea, and found ‘‘significant and
seemingly systematic biases’’ in the methodologies of the
auditors, which ‘‘question[ed] the company’s very ability
to conduct monitoring that is truly independent’’
(O’Rourke 2000, p. 7). The Tazreen Tragedy, yet another
recent disaster to strike the Bangladeshi RMG industry,
illustrates how global buying firms are having little influ-
ence in developing the social responsibility of their supply
firms in developing countries.
Tazreen Fashions Ltd (Tazreen) produced ready-made
garments and globally supplied them to many well-known
retail brands. On 25 November 2012, a tragic fire broke out
in the Tazreen factory, located in Dhaka, Bangladesh,
which claimed the lives of 112 employees and injured
many more (Solaiman 2013). Factory fires, such as this one
are sadly all too common in the RMG industry, and result
for many reasons, including overcrowded production lines,
electrical faults, inappropriate storage of flammable
chemicals, faulty fire extinguishers and fire exits being
obstructed by inventory (Solaiman 2013). This incident
should never have occurred, particularly as Tazreen is a
member of the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and
Exporters Association (BGMEA), and has been a partici-
pant in the buyer-driven GSC for more than 12 years. At
the time of the tragic incident, Tazreen had a contract for
RMG production with Walmart.
If a supply firm is non-compliance with its social
responsibilities, the global buying firm can either ‘cut and
run’ or engage in a remediation process (Dickson et al.
2009). Prior to the fire, it is believed that Walmart did not
follow either option and there are strong indications that
there were multiple Walmart suppliers using Tazreen since
April 2012, with at least one supplier filling a Walmart
contract when the fire broke out (Dickson et al. 2009).
Although Walmart conducted an audit of Tazreen’s social
responsibility practices, and it was noted as being a ‘risky
factory’, the powerful global buying firm ignored the risks
and continued its relationship with Tazreen. Evidently,
Walmart failed to do its part in developing the social
responsibility of the Bangladeshi supply firms within the
RMG industry (Chan and Siu 2010). Walmart should have
exercised its powerful authority to initiate a remediation
process to create a corrective action plan in collaboration
with Tazreen, governmental agencies and other stake-
holders (Mamic 2005).
It is possible for global buying firms to make an impact
upon the CSR of their suppliers, as they set up and control
a wide range of activities within the GSC (Perry et al.
2015; Soundararajan and Brown 2014). Profits in this
chain are gained from a ‘‘unique combination of high-
value research, design, sales, marketing and financial
services that allow the global buying firms to act as
strategic brokers in linking overseas factories with
evolving product niches in the main consumer markets’’
(Lin 2007, p. 335). Moreover, as opposed to the producer-
driven supply chains, buyer-driven supply chains are
decentralized, therefore, suppliers situated in different
developing countries do not have bargaining leverage over
global buying firms (DiCaprio 2013; Egels-Zande´n 2013).
Global buying firms, along with international brands,
control these activities and are able to shape consumer
demand through the use of brand names and strategic
networks (Jørgensen et al. 2003; Roberts et al. 2006).
With this leverage, they aim to purchase high quality
products at low prices that are made in socially respon-
sible ways, but do not want to increase production costs.
There is therefore no incentive to be a socially responsible
and accountable supplier. Lin (2007) defines this as
‘policy schizophrenia’, which pushes the RMG suppliers
to appear to demonstrate socially responsible practices
without actually making any changes.
Evidently, it seems that global buying firms are only
concerned with the CSR of supplier’s when faced with
legitimate threats to the firm’s reputation and brand image
(Egels-Zande´n and Hyllman 2006; Frenkel and Kim 2004;
Haltsones et al. 2007; Roberts 2003). These fears have lead
buying firm to use codes and monitor standards as ‘‘a
strategy to reduce reputational risks in the market place’’
(Cowe 2004; Graham and Woods 2006; O’Rourke 2003).
Codes of conduct can increase a firm’s profitability, defend
legitimate threats from media and civil society organiza-
tions, reduce costs as a result of a reduced need to switch
suppliers, and can increase competitiveness in the mar-
ketplace through enhanced relationships with consumers
M. M. Rahim
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(Goyder and Desmond 2000).5 Despite these potentially
positive outcomes, global buying firms mainly use them as
a risk management strategy, instead of being genuinely
concerned socially acceptable occupational health and
safety practices. The nature of the work appeared to be
influenced by whether or not the media was involved in
highlighting particular issues (Graham and Woods 2006;
The Financial Times 2004). Consequently, global suppliers
also need to be encouraged to promote and employ socially
responsible procedures.
Social Responsibility Practices of Global RMG
Suppliers in GSC
RMG supply firms in developing countries generally have
four major ways to access the global market. Firstly, as
producers selling into final markets on an arms-length
basis; secondly, as a group of producers; thirdly, as sup-
pliers in GSC where the global buyers coordinate the
production networks; and finally, as part of a transnational
corporation-driven vertically integrated network. However,
most firms access the global market via the GSC.
In buyer-driven GSCs, firms tend to ensure that their
suppliers incorporate social issues into their responsibility
practices (Perry et al. 2015; Ruwanpura and Wrigley
2011). This ensures long-term profits, positive product
branding and high-standard managerial efficiencies (Black
2008; Dickson et al. 2009; Laudal 2010; Yu 2008). A
survey found that out of the three most common criteria on
which a global buyer selects its suppliers, two are related to
the suppliers’ performance in managing social responsi-
bilities (Bellesi et al. 2005). In particular, this survey
referred to the RMG industry in Bangladesh, and the sup-
pliers’ ability to manage the negative impact of their
business operations on both societal and environmental
platforms (Bellesi et al. 2005). Another survey on global
buyers and their demands for social responsibility practices
showed that global buyers asked 60 % of supply firms
about their safety policies and regulations, 43 % about their
environmental policies and 17 % about social issues (Ar-
ticle 2003). This indicates that the majority of buying firms
are considering the social responsibility practices of current
and potential suppliers.
Although global buying firms have developed different
strategies to respond to their social responsibility needs, they
are keen on shifting these responsibilities to their suppliers,
for whom these then become regulations (Mann et al. 2014;
Rondinelli and Berry 2000). Subsequently, suppliers are
required to implement socially acceptable measures and have
little power to avoid or alter these requirements (Amaeshi
et al. 2008; Emmelhainz and Adams 1999). Suppliers must
guarantee that they are able to implement these regulations;
demonstrating this through carrying out audits on social
responsibility processes (Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen 2013;
Graafland 2002; Kaptein 2004). Therefore, if a labour inten-
sive firm wants to be a global supplier it must theoretically be
efficient in social responsibility performance (Miles and
Munilla 2004; Mollenkopf et al. 2010).6
In reality, pressure fromglobal buyingfirms, and their codes
of conduct has had little influence on the social responsibility
performance of supply firms (Barrientos and Smith 2007; Kim
2013; Locke et al. 2007, 2009; Wells 2007). This has eventu-
ated because codes fail to produce sustained improvements to
RMG suppliers in developing countries (Chan and Siu 2010).
Locke et al. (2007) assessed Nike’s internal rating of 800
supply firms across 51 countries and found that 44 % of the
supply firms did not improve their social responsibility per-
formance; in fact, 36 % recorded a decline. GAP, a leader in
using codes of conduct in the GSC, has also publicly
acknowledged this limitation (Barrientos and Smith 2007).
This concerning realization requires a thorough examination
about the social responsibility practices that are currently
operational in the Bangladesh RMG industry.
Social Responsibility Practices in the Bangladesh
RMG Industry
The Bangladesh RMG Industry
Bangladesh is the third largest RMG exporter worldwide,
accounting for 4.7 % of global apparel export in 2012,
5 Claiming responsibility from the global buyers for their suppliers’
performance in the sourcing countries is problematic. In another
sense, it is hard to establish some sort of cause and effect relationship
between the buying firms and their suppliers’ activities in sourcing
countries. It could be easier if a legal duty can be established in this
relationship. But to make them morally responsible is always very
hard as it is quite irrational to make one answerable for an action that
lies beyond one’s control. To this end Amaeshi et al. poses some vital
questions: ‘[w]hat if one’s psychological and physical conditions do
not permit one to give an account of one’s actions, who should be
accountable for this case?’ In response to this, it could be argued that
the more powerful in an economic relationship should bear the
responsibilities of the weaker party. However, I think that both the
global suppliers and supply firms in sourcing countries should be
responsible to society given their relative power positions in the
market. Nevertheless, these are critical issues and ‘raise the funda-
mental challenges of fatalism and determinism in relation to the
concept of ‘responsibility’’. For details, see Amaeshi et al. (2008) and
Craig (2000). I have intentionally avoided a discussion on this issue as
I considered this beyond the scope of this article.
6 It would be worth mentioning here that these days, global buyers
are committing resources to find ways to define and implement this
audit system, especially due to the increased environmental and
labour related issues and considerable consumer demand for social
responsibility among supply firms. For details, see Dickson et al.
(2009), Emmelhainz and Adams (1999) and Juulsen and Knudsen
(2010).
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compared with only 0.6 % in 1990 (World Trade Orga-
nization 2013). This industry is divided into two main
parts: knitting factories and woven factories. Currently
there are more than 6525 factories (Association 2011)
employing 4 million workers, of whom 80 % are female
(Hossain 2013). Other than a few factories in the export-
processing zones, almost all are locally owned and situ-
ated in the capital city Dhaka, the port city Chittagong or
the industrial city Narayanganj. The comparatively low
labour costs is the main reason for the expansion of this
industry from 0.001 % of the country’s total export
earnings in 1976 to approximately 77 % by 2011 (ILO
2013).
Social Responsibility Practices in the Bangladesh
RMG Industry
Over the last 15 years, global clothing firms in the United
States and Europe have greatly increased their imports
from Bangladesh. International fashion brands and retail-
ers, including HandM, CandA, MandS, Walmart, GAP,
Levi’s, s.Oliver, Tesco, Zara, Target, Carrefour, JCPenney
and many more, are not only increasingly relying on the
RMG industry in Bangladesh, but they have also set up
liaison offices in this country (Brenton and Hoppe 2007;
Greenhouse 2013; Rojas 2013). While the main function of
these liaison offices is to manage the relationship with the
RMG producing firms in Bangladesh, they are also
responsible for ensuring that their suppliers enforce
workplace regulations that are acceptable to western con-
sumers (Kolk and Van Tulder 2002). Consequently,
socially responsible practices and auditing procedures are
vital for the RMG industry in Bangladesh. However, the
firms currently in operation within this industry do not see
these functions as crucial to the benefit of the society
within which they operate. Rather, interest lies in social
auditing as a means to the maintenance of supply contracts
(Egels-Zande´n 2013). In the interviews conducted by Islam
and Deegan (2008), the interviewees explained that social
audits would not be undertaken in the absence of a demand
from global buying firms. In this sense, from the perspec-
tives of the local manufacturers and suppliers, social audits
are effectively mandatory given that requests for them
typically come with every order placed. It is worth noting
here that in the above mentioned Islam and Deegan’s
study, none of the persons interviewed considered the
benefits that social audits might create for employees.
Indeed, they argued that even the chief officials of supply
firms in the industry considered social audits as costly
exercises that are only financially beneficial if the outcome
of the audit is positive. Such results are generally consis-
tent with the perspectives provided by executives of the
Bangladesh Garments Manufacturer and Exporters Asso-
ciation (BGMEA). Islam and Deegan (2008) also found
that the BGMEA undertook particular actions (disclosure
of social performance information) because of the expec-
tations of global buyers instead of any underlying ethical
reason pertaining to responsibility.
Being less vulnerable to issues of legitimacy and repu-
tation, these supply firms lack the need to implement
procedures that are socially responsible (Roberts 2003). As
a result, supply firms consciously attempt to decouple
social audit policies and practices by engaging in elaborate
symbolic actions to deceive their buyers’ auditors (Egels-
Zande´n 2013; MacLean and Behnam 2010; Taylor 2011).
For instance, an investigation revealed that most of the
RMG factories near the capital city of Bangladesh do not
use their effluent plants regularly. They have constructed
these plants as a requirement for obtaining orders from the
high profile buying firms, but only use them when the
buyers and governmental agencies are scheduled to con-
duct inspections. This investigation into the environmental
pollution caused by the export-oriented RMG manufac-
turing firms covered a region containing three villages
(Kumkumari, Khagan and Basaet) located next to the
Turag river, approximately 35 km from Dhaka. These three
villages alone have 30 export-oriented RMG manufactur-
ing firms of which almost all have effluent plants (Sarker
2011). These firms are occasionally subjected to inspec-
tions and pay fines for not using their effluent plants reg-
ularly. Despite this, pollution in these villages is continuing
to accumulate and thousands of tonnes of toxic liquids
wash through the agricultural fields and enter the Turag
river every day. The water in the Turag contains only
0.4–0.5 mg/litre of oxygen and is losing its usual volume
of flow, and the local villagers are now exposed to a toxic
environment.
Evidently, the current social audit process employed
within the Bangladesh RMG industry is flawed for two
main reasons. First, the management of a firm in this
industry can control the whole process by strategically
regulating this practice and disseminating only the infor-
mation it deems appropriate to advance the firm’s image,
rather than being truly transparent and accountable to
society (Adams 2004; Gray 2001; Parker 2002). Secondly,
in the absence of a direct threat, management can confine
this auditing to operate largely as a management tool (Hess
2009b; Owen et al. 2000, 2001). In the RMG industry,
firms are very focused on profit maximization without
complying with national or international legal standards.
These are the required legal elements of CSR, and through
non-compliance, supply firms are failing to abide by basic
standards of social responsibility (Carroll 1991; Visser
2008). In addition, the owners of firms are neglecting basic
ethical standards by exploiting labour in poor working
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conditions. In this industry, workers are considered as
assets, and hence strategies related to workers are solely
based on cost–benefit analyses designed to generate quick
returns (Hussain 2007; Majumder and Begum 2000).
Although there are some firms which do provide basic
human rights and acceptable conditions for their workers, it
can still be observed that the industry is focused on eco-
nomic goals over legal and social responsibilities to
stakeholders (Campagine 2010).
Under these circumstances, the legal systems in
developing countries could play an important role, but it
seems that most of these countries’ laws relevant to
business and CSR do not have an adequate focus or
appropriate strategies to demand that corporate self-reg-
ulators fulfil their social responsibilities (Ruwanpura and
Wrigley 2011; Raj-Reichert 2013). In Bangladesh, the
Companies Act 1994, the Bangladesh Labour Law 2006
and the Environmental Conservation Act 1995 are pro-
scriptive, and they do not have substantive provisions to
enable the development of firms’ self-regulated responsi-
bility systems (Rahim 2013). The Companies Act 1994
does not provide the required focus on social responsi-
bilities of firms or the liabilities of firm owners for this
development. This Act does not incorporate necessary
strategies that force directors of supply firms to place
social responsibility issues at the centre of their internal
policies and strategies (Rahim 2012b). Though the Ban-
gladesh Labour Law 2006 provides a long list of labour
rights, the implementation strategies mentioned in it are
not sufficient to develop a welfare-oriented workplace
management system. Its provisions are descriptive, and
the punishment measures detailed in it do not seem
worthwhile (Rahim 2012b). The Environmental Conser-
vation Act 1995 asserts some modern ideas to curb
industrial pollution, though it does not possess the
required strategies to implement these ideas. It prescribes
penalties for breaches of its provisions, but it does not
provide adequate directions to effectively impose them.
Its sole dependence on government agencies for its
administration is another disadvantage that makes it
ineffective (Rahim 2012b). These laws are based on the
command and control approach, which does not support
the growing separation of law making in a democratic
system. Stones (1975) termed this type of legal approach
as ‘problematic’, arguing that it acts only after a problem
has occurred, requires significant costs and policing, does
not hold the values of the society and focuses more on
duties instead of aspirations (Hess 2009a; Stone 1975).
From a developing country perspective, monitoring the
internal regulation of firms is difficult, particularly when
the government agencies are highly corrupt (Transparency
International Bangladesh 2013) and do not have the nec-
essary expertise to assess corporate responsibility (Rahman
and Langford 2012, p. 97).7 It is also a problem that a large
portion of the media is either owned or supported by the
owners of polluting industries. Under these circumstances,
scholarly evidence and best practice suggests that regula-
tors should use a mix of regulatory agencies and strategies,
rather than relying on any single agency and strategy
(Gunningham et al. 1998; Hutter 2006; May 2005; Vogel
2010; Winter and May 2001). A NG approach in law can
foster this mix effectively: it can combine various agencies
to mitigate the drawbacks in public and private regulations
and governmental agencies. The following parts of this
article discuss more about this approach in law.
The New Governance Approach to Improve
Firms’ Social Responsibility
What is the New Governance (NG)?
NG comes from a conceptual background which examines
how corporate decision-making and people-friendly busi-
ness strategies have begun to converge. It relies on exec-
utive fiduciary duties, stakeholder engagement and
economic analysis of management incentives. It addresses
how firms incorporate stakeholder-friendly business
strategies, examines the role of shareholders and board
activism in pushing for social responsibility (Rahim 2012a;
Soundararajan and Brown 2014). Also it provides quanti-
tative assessments of reporting practices, indices and rat-
ings that link governance with responsibility.8 NG
converges the rule-making power of the government and
the strength of stakeholders as well as the private ordering
system. This convergence would assist in the development
of any strategy for improving social responsibility (Rahim
and Alam 2013).
There are significant differences between traditional
governance and the NG model. The differences are high-
lighted in an examination of the approach to socio-political
and economic issues in developing countries.
7 Corruption in this country is prevalent in both the public and private
sectors between 2006 and 2008, Bangladesh was considered the most
corrupt country in the world; more recently, corruption has been
reduced and Bangladesh has now become the world’s 12th and 13th
most corrupt country in 2010 and 2011, respectively. Other
economies at the 13th position are Ecuador, Ethiopia, Guatemala,
Iran, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Mozambique and the Solomon islands.
Of 183 economies, Bangladesh ranks 120th on Transparency
international’s Corruption Perception index 2011. For details, see
Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perception index’ http://cpi.
transparency.org/cpi2011/ at 2 December 2011.
8 For details, see Gill (2008). Regarding fiduciary duty aspect in NG,
see Johnson and Millon (2004) and Blair and Stout (2001). For
stakeholder aspect see Mitchell (1992). For economic analysis, see
Mackenzie (2007), Johnston (2005) and Kolk (2008).
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Dimension Traditional vs new governance
Participation by
stakeholders
The NG approach mobilizes actors
(either on their own initiative or in
partnership with the state) rather than
relying on government for solutions to
public problems (Salamon 2000)
Use of tools rather than
programs
The NG approach emphasizes the
application of tools by stakeholders. It
avoids a reliance on programs or
agencies in which problems of
politicization or recruitment exist. It
proposes that the division between
policy and administration (as assumed
by classical theory) is not working
(Salamon 2000)
Problem solving within a
system of networks
The NG approach works with networks
and not within a hierarchy. This means
that the public problems are not solved
by government; third parties can
become private actors and become
engaged. They will become allies to
the government which will lose some
control but gain the benefits of the new
approach (Kooiman 1993; Trubek and
Trubek 2007; Salamon 2000)
Inclusion of private actors The NG approach aims to minimize the
debate over public versus private. It
suggests working with public and
private themes. This will replace
competition with collaboration
(Salamon 2000)
Decentralization of power The NG approach decentralizes power
by replacing the ‘command and
control’ strategy of administration
with ‘negotiation and persuasion’. It
rejects privatization in the free market
and proposes that government is still
necessary for the provision of public
welfare (Salamon 2000)
NG Approach in Law
NG converges the core of the three dominant theories of
regulation: public interest, private interest and regulatory
capture. While public interest theory protects the public
from market failure, private interest theory regards regu-
lation as a tool for transferring the wealth to the interest
group with political power (Chalmers et al. 2012; Stigler
1971; Watts and Zimmerman 1979). Regulatory capture
theory assumes that the regulatee captures the regulators
and thereby dominates the public interest. The NG model
provides a chance for both regulators and regulatees to play
a role in the framing regulation in a way that serves all
stakeholders in the best possible way (Soundararajan and
Brown 2014). For example, regulators attempt to link
social values to economic incentives and disincentives;
stakeholders influence firms to effectively respond to these
values; and regulatees develop internal regulation to
respond to this in the most effective manner (Hess 2009a).
Rubin (2005) finds NG approach preferable where the
regulator ‘knows the result it is trying to achieve but does
not know the means for achieving it, when circumstances
are likely to change in ways that the [regulator] cannot
predict, or when the [regulator] does not even know the
precise result that she desires’ (p. 2131).
There may be potential reservations that this approach
may facilitate more pronounced government intervention
in these autonomous processes by imposing particular pre-
determined distributive outcomes. However, an NG
approach to laws is aimed at empowering the many, rather
than emboldening existing power hierarchies, particularly
in terms of the role of the state. Thus, NG is a means of
creating positive regulation that seeks to devolve and
confer the regulatory power of different social actors to
ones’ self-regulatory processes (Barnard et al. 2005). The
laws that allow collective bargaining by trade unions to
make qualified exceptions to limits on working time, or
similar standards in labour management, could be said to
incorporate the NG approach (Barnard et al. 2005). With
this approach, a law can try to ‘regulate’ not only through
‘performance’ but also through influencing centres of ‘re-
flexion’ within other social sub-systems (Wilthagen and
Rogowski 2002). It can create a situation where decisions
are made on the basis of procedures. This results in deci-
sions being made by the stakeholders whose interests will
be directly affected (Fiorino 1999).
If such pluralism is considered vital in any legal regu-
lation, including NG approach in laws is a viable way to
incorporate the notion of responsibility into firms’ internal
management practices. Indeed, embedding NG into leg-
islative processes could help regulators create a more
socially responsible regulatory culture, as non-govern-
mental stakeholders would be in a stronger position to
persuade firms’ management to embrace the ethos of social
responsibility (Grabosky 1995). This is particularly nec-
essary for Bangladesh where agencies of the state ‘‘have
been captured by members of a powerful nexus who have
developed a symbiotic relationship with the state, affecting
its institutional capacity to reduce corruption, strengthen
transparency and accountability’’ (Alam and Teicher 2012,
p 858). A point which is particularly relevant to the RMG
industry. The size of the industry means that the govern-
ment must now respond to the demands of garment factory
owners. As a collective group, these owners have now
emerged as a ‘central political player’ (Kazmin 2010).
They have the ability to influence both the legislative and
executive branches of the state. Their power is such that
state agencies promote the interests of the industry, and
defer to non-involvement in labour rights and issues by
‘watching from the side line’ (Haque and Azmat 2015).
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It would be worth mentioning here that the criticism
regarding ‘hollowing the state’ is not a moot point in the
context of a NG approach in law. The basis of such law is
neither totally ‘decentred’ or ‘centred’, nor created only by
the state or private parties.9 Rather, it is based on the
conceptual core of both decentred and centred under-
standings of law (Scott 2004). While its values are deter-
mined by political powers, its implementation strategies
are provided by private actors (Rahim 2013). In the context
of the pluralisation of actors exercising social power
(where it is accepted that government does not have a
monopoly on power and governance should not be con-
trolled solely by the private parties) the NG approach
disperses legal control. The control is shared between
social actors within the broader context of regulators and
regulatees (Rahim 2013; Soundararajan and Brown 2014).
Here, the rationale behind this dispersal of power is that the
greater scope for exercising autonomy will facilitate the
regulatees’ ability to integrate social values within their
governance.
The inclusion of a NG approach in laws is complex, as
this approach aims to incorporate interactions between
actors, the nature and relevance of which changes over
time. Since these interactions are intricate and the actors
involved are diverse in their goals, intentions, purposes,
norms and abilities, this legal approach might seem overly
involved. Nonetheless, it possesses rationality and coher-
ence in its structural formation (Rahim 2013). The fol-
lowing section takes a look at the prospect of a strategy for
inserting the NG approach in laws to improve firms’ social
responsibility.
Using the NG Approach in Laws to Improve Social
Responsibility
In the business regulation landscape, the NG approach to
laws links sociological conditions to business regulations,
instead of the orthodox cost–benefit analysis or command
and control regulations approach. This approach is con-
sidered to be a vital part of a regulatory policy that desires
to think reflexively about regulation and tend to indirectly
regulate the social and individual actions (Black 2002a;
Morgan 2003; Baldwin et al. 1998). This legislative
approach denotes the presence of a strategy that could
initiate a series of activities in which both regulatees and
regulators can reach a given objective (Parker 2007). Laws
that empower stakeholders to influence policy framing in
firms can be an effective incorporation to this NG
approach. It must also be noted that the core of stakeholder
thinking enhances the NG approach in law to improve
firms’ social responsibility. As such, the definition and
identification of a stakeholder is important in understand-
ing how this approach works in a legal context (Deegan
and Shelly 2006).
Very simply, the word ‘stake’ means a right to do
something in response to any act or attachment (Rahim
2011a). Since rights are generally associated with liabili-
ties, this word also includes liabilities incurred for enjoying
a particular right. Hence, a stake could be a reasonable
share of something. It could also be a financial involvement
with an entity or industry. From the perspective of an
organizational stakeholder, Carroll identifies three sources
of stakes, with ownership and moral rights at opposite
extremes, and interest lying in between the two limits
(Siljala 2009, p. 23).
The word ‘holder’ denotes a person or entity that faces
some consequences or needs to respond to an act or to meet
a certain need (Rahim 2011a). From the organization and
management perspective, Freeman defines a stakeholder as
‘‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by
the achievement of the firm’s objectives’’ (Freeman 1984,
p. 46).
Carroll and Buchholtz (2009) define ‘stakeholders’ from
a broader perspective, positing that they can be ‘‘any
individuals or groups who can affect or are affected by the
actions, decisions, policies, regulations or goals of an
organisation’’ (p. 113). Mitchell et al. (1997) conversely
divides stakeholders into three groups based on the salience
of their power, legitimacy and urgency of their claims.
Hence employees, customers, owners, competitors, gov-
ernment and civil society organizations could all be
stakeholders of a firm. Gray et al. (1996) extended these
categories by including future generations and non-human
life to this list (Gray et al. 1996; Siljala 2009).
Within business and societal relations, the core ideas10
of stakeholder thinking are that:
1. Stakeholders can create standards for firms and reflect
on firms’ implementation of these standards (Freeman
9 For details of ‘hollowing the state’ see McCann (1996) and
Rosenberg (1992, 2008); regarding the understanding of ‘decentred’
law, see Black (2002b) and Blackett (2000). For the understanding of
‘centred’ law, see Teubner (1987) and Nokolas (1999).
10 These ideas indeed challenge the central position of managerial
capitalism. There are two arguments for this challenge. The first
argument considers that today’s firms are no longer fit for the old
modelled governance. It argues that the concept of ownership has
shifted, and that firms can no longer accurately be viewed as private
property to their owners. The second argument develops around the
power relationship between business and society. It claims that social
power comes with social responsibility, and hence failing to mitigate
the costs that arise out of industrial pollution, hazardous products, job
dissatisfaction etc., must raise questions about the exercising and
limiting of corporate power.
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et al. 2004; Gilbert and Rasche 2008; Hill and Jones
1992; Rahim 2011a), and
2. Firms have a responsibility to consider stakeholders’
views in their internal regulation (Evan and Freeman
1988; Jones and Wicks 1999; Kaler 2003; Phillips
2003; Reed 2009).
Consequently, there could be regulatory strategies to use
stakeholder engagement to develop firms’ responsibility for
social issues (Crane et al. 2004). The Proper Prokasih
Program of Indonesia is an example of this. Under this
program, regulators rank the performance of individual
firms using surveys, a pollution database of team reports
and independent audits. They also make their findings
available to the public (via a colour-coded system of
business activities that have environmental impacts). The
instruments in this program allow stakeholders to question
firms that have non-satisfactory performance standards.
Therefore, if a firm is marked as black, blue, or red that
firm usually needs to negotiate its pollution-control
strategies with stakeholders from public agencies, envi-
ronmental groups and community representatives. In fact,
various countries have already utilized this or similar
approaches.
The United States has incorporated this NG approach in
both the National Environmental Policy Act 1969 and the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
1986. Under these Acts, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) prepares a ‘toxic release inventory’ and
makes it accessible to the public.11 This strategy ‘‘has
dramatically outperformed all other EPA regulations over
the last 10 years in terms of overall [toxin] reductions and
that it has done so at a fraction of the cost [of]… other
programs’’ (Fung and O’Rourke 2000, p. 116; Fung et al.
2004; Hess 2007). Various Chinese laws also give stake-
holders a say in the regulation of policies that control a
firm’s internal management strategies (Zhao et al. 2013).
These laws include the National Consumer Rights Protec-
tion Law; the Defective Automobile Products Recall
Regulation 2004; the Environment Impact Assessment Law
2002; the Labor Contract Law 2008 and the Labor Dispute
Mediation and Arbitration Law 2008.
Similar legislative frameworks were also employed in
India and the Netherlands. The relevant Indian examples
include the Consumer Protection Act 1986, the Environ-
mental Protection Act 1986 and the Industrial Disputes Act
1980 (Zhao et al. 2013). The examples from the Nether-
lands include the Structure Act 1971 and the Works
Council Act 1971. These Acts have given a legal right to
the employees to monitor a firm’s internal policy framing,
allowing the non-shareholder stakeholders to address the
gap between the firm’s self-regulation and public policy
goals.
The basis of this stakeholder oriented NG approach is a
combination of a few socio-economic principles—a firm’s
operations need to be legitimate to ensure that they are
functional, particularly where stakeholders are the most
suitable source in gaining legitimacy. Moreover, since
stakeholders can also be the consumers, their collective
initiatives have the ability to affect the business perfor-
mance of a firm (Owen et al. 2001; Unerman et al. 2007;
Unerman and Bennett 2004). Although countries do and
should employ differing legislative schemes, there are
similarities in terms of the theory behind the application of
this approach.
Bangladesh can also incorporate this NG approach by
reforming legislation to ensure that stakeholders have an
input in the social responsibility practices of supply firms
within the RMG industry. This is vital because employers
in this industry treat their labour force as a fixed cost and
do not want to index social responsibility practices to
productivity (Khatun 2008). Although these approaches
may provide initial benefits, they may lead to frequent
labour agitations and a tendency to ignore social respon-
sibility issues in the long term. Islam and Deegan (2008)
have illustrated this attitude, describing a notice12 circu-
lated to the members of the BGMEA, which stated that
firms should not use child labour due to the ‘‘potentially
negative economic effects of being identified as using child
labour, and the impact this had on the survival of the
industry’’ (p. 854).
Currently, the usual corporate attitude towards social
responsibility within this industry is as follows: ‘‘[W]e are
complying with all the rules and regulations, but we do not
need to disclose’’ (Belal 2008, p. 38). This attitude conveys
the message of ‘‘[t]rust us, and everything will be alright’’
(Nasrullah and Rahim 2014), however, this corporate out-
look has not been reflected in management strategies. A
survey-based study conducted by the Centre for Policy
Dialogue has revealed a gap between corporate promises
and reality in Bangladesh. This study found that more than
60 % of the respondent firms did not have well-articulated
policies to deal with worker rights and related issues, and
none of the responding firms had a director assigned to
address these issues (Jabed and Rahman 2003, p. 5). On the
issues of sustainable development and human rights, only
11.1 and 4.4 % of firms respectively, had people dedicated
to these issues at a management level (Jabed and Rahman
2003). This article accordingly advocates for the legislative
11 The Environmental Protection Agency first released its publication
in 1980. It published information about the top emitters of toxic
chemicals at the national level in national newspapers and the specific
figures of the region’s largest polluters in the local newspapers. For
details, see Snyder (2007). 12 Circular No. BGA/ssd/2005/128, Dec. 10, 2005.
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incorporation of ‘bounty hunters’ and protection for whistle
blowers, to add a NG approach to laws that govern the
social responsibility performance of the RMG industry in
Bangladesh.
Legal Assurance for the ‘Bounty Hunters’ Rights
and Responsibilities
Bangladesh can introduce a new law to acknowledge the
rights and responsibilities of ‘bounty hunters’ as long as the
‘bounty hunters’ are assisting the regulators in monitoring
corporate fraud and social responsibility within the country
(Rahim 2011a). This legal acknowledgement can assist
government agencies, the BGMEA and global buying firms
to use the skills of different professional groups acting
within the industry. Once the law grants the right to
intensify this approach, a significant number of profes-
sionals (as bounty hunters) would be encouraged to con-
tinuously observe the actions of firms’ and check
irregularities in audits of non-financial issues. An impact of
this strategy would be that the firms are more able to meet
their legal requirements, social commitments and are less
interested in management of government authorities
through inappropriate means (Harrison and Wicks 2013;
Soundararajan and Brown 2014).
The term ‘bounty hunters’ refers to individuals or pro-
fessional bodies who are experts in using secondary
materials to discern what the real situation is. For example,
private auditors may be able to discover missing informa-
tion by assessing a firm’s social responsibility profiles.
They could be considered to be bounty hunters. The
incentive for bounty hunters is that they can obtain a share
of the results they achieve for the authoritative bodies (for
example, global buyers, government and the BGMEA).13
Where the social audit reports of firms in the RMG industry
are available in a usable form, they can be assessed by
private auditors. These individuals might highlight a point
which a supply firm auditor or a buying firm affiliated
auditor concealed or intentionally overlooked. In this sit-
uation, the government, the BGMEA or the consortium of
buying firms would not hesitate to provide financial
remuneration to the auditor. This would provide further
incentive to detect more anomalies or loopholes in the
social auditing regulations of supply firms (Harrison and
Wicks 2013).
A relevant law would assist in creating potential bounty
hunters by providing a direction to the government agen-
cies, industry organizations, business partners and the
professional bodies to share their information and expertise
for the benefit of the whole industry (Harrison and Wicks
2013). The factory owners’ association within the RMG
industry in Bangladesh is well organized and holds a rich
set of data on factory information. The buyers’ consortium
for this industry has developed a database, mostly con-
taining information on issues of social responsibility within
Bangladesh. The government also holds significant records
on these factories’ performances, as this flagship industry is
one of the biggest foreign currency earners. There is
potential for the BGMEA, and buyers’ consortiums, to
provide a guideline for accessing such information by the
members of some professional bodies. This would assist
the increase the number of potential bounty hunters for this
industry.
A law on the rights and accountability of the ‘bounty
hunters’ would create roles for members of professional
bodies to assist in the regulation of socio-economic issues
in the Bangladesh RMG industry. This would also help to
develop the credibility of the responsible institutions.
Institutions in this industry, for instance, the trade unions
are very politicized (Kabeer and Mahmud 2003). Leader-
ship within these organizations is based on political power
relationships rather than worker support. A study by Khan
(2006) found that only one in seven trade union leaders
had experience in the RMG sector. Other trade union
leaders came from other organizations and industries
through political affiliations. RMG factory owners in
Bangladesh often do not support the trade unions, and
blame them for disruptive actions which take place in the
factories (Kabeer and Mahmud 2003, p. 33). Corruption is
also a significant problem, being present in many of the
agencies involved in the implementation of regulations
(Rahman and Langford 2012, p. 97; Transparency Inter-
national Bangladesh 2013).
The objective of legally involving ‘bounty hunters’ in
RMG regulation is to increase vigilance in this industry,
and to ensure that groups with vested interests do not create
information asymmetry and totally control the regulation of
responsibility audits. Braithwaite (2011) and Porter (2009)
find this to be one of the most effective ways of raising the
commitments of all parties to improve the social respon-
sibility performance of firms (Braithwaite 2011; Porter
2009). This regulation strategy has been incorporated into
many strong economies. For example, England and Wales
incorporated this idea into the Common Informers Act
1951, and in the USA, the Federal False Claims Act 2010,
has given the concept a more principled footing (Braith-
waite 2006, p. 895). These pieces of legislation detail the
incentives for the informer for initiating judicial action
against an offender as well as the penalties for abusing the
right of private prosecution (Sims 2002). Some developing
countries are also including this strategy into their non-
legal regulations. In South Korea, for instance, there is now
widespread public education in this area (which is even
13 On the effectiveness of private bounties for detecting corporate
wrongdoing, see Fisse and Braithwaite (1983).
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being presented in schools). Recently, Seoul City Council
advertised that it would provide a reward of up to US$1.7
million for information about corruption involving Council
staff members (Sang-Hun 2011).
Legal Protection for the ‘Whistleblowers’
Enabling ‘whistleblowers’ to participate in the regulation
of social responsibility could be another useful NG strat-
egy. Pascoe and Rachagan (2005) describe whistleblowing
as ‘‘the disclosure of information by someone who rea-
sonably believes such information is evidence of contra-
vention of any laws or indicates any mismanagement,
corruption or abuse of authority’’ (p. 106). Any person
within an organization can be a whistleblower. In partic-
ular, senior managers can be the best whistleblowers, as
they understand the positives and negatives of audit
strategies and transactions. This means that they are in a
better position to publicly announce allegations of fraud or
unethical transactions that contravene the law and other
social values (Forensic 2005; Miceli et al. 2013; Taylor and
Curtis 2010). Furthermore, an aggrieved employee could
also become a whistleblower. He or she could ‘blow the
whistle’ by reporting fraud or dishonesty at an organiza-
tional level.
By introducing this policy, a firm can indirectly develop
a cooperative culture that encourages staff to report mis-
conduct and allows reports to be thoroughly investigated.
In addition, proving protection for whistleblowers, it can
raise awareness of a firm’s code of conduct and initiate
ongoing reviews of overall performance (Braithwaite
2013b; Rachagan and Kuppusamy 2013). It can also assist
in ensuring that the government, the BGMEA or the buy-
ers’ consortium are all adhering to their commitments,
which may result in RMG firms becoming more vigilant.
This would ultimately facilitate an ethical base in which a
firm’s policies could be developed to incorporate appro-
priate social responsibility performances (Rachagan and
Kuppusamy 2013).
Whistleblowers may raise an issue to a prescribed body,
or other individuals, within the organization. They may
also express their allegations to regulators, law enforce-
ment agencies, the media, or other groups concerned with
the issue at hand (Latimer 2003; Lindquist 2003).
Although this is not a new approach in regulation, it
could be a new and indirect way of improving firms’
responsibility in those societies where law enforcement
agencies do not have the ability to obtain all the required
information. In the United States, if a lawsuit initiated from
the information provided by a whistleblower is successful,
the whistleblower usually receives 15–25 % of any settle-
ment or judgment resulting from recognition of fraud,
unethical transactions or inappropriate policies
(Braithwaite 2006; Hargrove and Raiborn 2013, p. 895).
Different legislations in different countries have also
incorporated similar incentives and detailed protection of
whistleblowers. These legislative frameworks include the
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2010; the
Capital Market Services Act and Firms (Amendment) Act
2007 of Malaysia; the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998
of the UK; the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 2002; the Tax Relief
and Health Care Act 2006; the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010; the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act 2009; and the Federal
False Claims Act 2010 of the United States. Australia has
also implemented strategies to protect whistleblowers by
incorporating provisions into the Australian Corporations
Act 2001 (Cth) in 2004 (Pascoe and Welsh 2011).
Effective protection incentives and the acknowledgment
of the stakeholder’s role in the implementation of legisla-
tion could pave the way for a tactical bargaining between
stakeholders and firms. If firms commit to reaching the
expected performance targets, stakeholders will delay
interference with the firms’ self-regulation. The crux of this
approach is therefore dependent upon the legal power
given to stakeholders to intervene with the RMG industry
and its responsibility practices. This legal power and pro-
tection is particularly necessary for aggrieved workers and
for resolving workplace issues before generating industry
attention. This would require the development of a new
status for RMG workers in Bangladesh.
Traditionally RMG factory workers come from the
poorer sections of rural areas (Balch 2013; Kabeer and
Mahmud 2003, p. 148). The average salary of a garment
worker in Bangladesh is equal to 42, 50 and 33 % of that of
India, Nepal and Sri Lanka respectively (Ahmed 2011). In
2006, the average wage per hour in Bangladesh was
US$0.15 (Chowdhury et al. 2006), which increased to only
US$0.22 in 2008 (Berik and van der Meulen Rodgers
2008). These uneducated and poor workers are placed in a
vulnerable workplace situation and are forced to work in
unhygienic environments that violate international labour
standards (Berik and van der Meulen Rodgers 2008). These
workers usually conceal these workplace issues because of
the fear that they may lose their jobs if they report these
issues to media or law enforcing authorities. It is normal
practice that factory owners follow an informal recruitment
system and do not provide contracts for new employees
(Kabeer and Mahmud 2003, p. 133). This means that there
is a high level of job insecurity (Majumder and Begum
2000), as factory owners are able to dismiss employees at
any time. Fearing that they will lose their jobs, workers
keep silent on issues of social responsibility (Bansari
2010). Workers are therefore exploited by being offered
low, irregular and discriminatory salaries, and are forced to
work under conditions that cause medical illnesses (Basak
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2008). Factory owners are powerful enough to obstruct any
moves to introduce minimum wages, work-hour restric-
tions, worker pension schemes or fringe benefits (Ahmed
and Peerlings 2009). Moreover, many of these individuals
and groups have established factories and manufacturing
premises without following building and safety codes (ILO
2013) or appropriate industrial standards (Rashid 2006).
This practice has had a significant effect on the local
environment and communities and include neighbourhood
insecurity, breaches in urban planning codes, increased fire
hazards from highly flammable raw material and products,
as well as domestic power shortages from the dispropor-
tionately high consumption of electricity, gas, air and noise
pollutions.
Where a worker has a legal right to raise an issue against
a firm’s management, there is a greater chance that the
RMG industry will become more attentive to maintaining
reasonable working conditions. If whistleblowers have the
guarantee of job security, they would be more inclined to
protect their rights and speak out against the industry’s
injustices. Whistleblowers and employees can thus assist
firms create a forum of restive justice and effectively
contribute to this conference.
In Bangladesh, the Company Act 1994 and the Ban-
gladesh Penal Code 1860, could have provisions ensuring
rights, immunities and protection of stakeholders. This
would encourage both stakeholders and firms to assist law
enforcement agencies by providing information about
business fraud, mistrust and non-compliance. The success
of this initiative is dependent on the available legal pro-
tection and incentives.14 Laws such as these in Vietnam
have helped to create a framework that allowed the com-
munity to become organized and to efficiently channel
information to regulatory agencies. In turn, this has
strengthened the regulatory agencies by reinforcing the
notion that firms must not be involved in activities that are
harmful to society (Graham and Woods 2006; O’Rourke
2003). Braithwaite defines this approach as a forward-
looking alternative to rule based punitive governance
(Braithwaite 2003). He argues that through this stakeholder
based NG approach, regulators can persuade firms to ‘‘take
responsibility for putting things right into the future’’
(Braithwaite 2013a, p. 462). In the restorative justice
conference, ‘‘stakeholders in an alleged injustice sit in a
circle to discuss the harm that has been done and arrive at
an understanding of its nature, take responsibility for it, and
then agree on a set of reforms to prevent recurrence, as well
as to repair past harm’’ (Braithwaite 2013a, p. 462). In a
situation where the stakeholders have adequate information
and skills to deal with the irresponsible activities of a firm,
it is apparent that the firm will have a very limited chance
of avoiding responsibility for restoring justice to victims,
offenders and communities (Braithwaite 2011).
The Whistle Blowers Protection Act of India was passed
in 2011. After the enactment of this legislation, both the
central and local governments of this country set up anti-
corruption whistleblowing hotlines and websites in the last
few years to accept information from the whistleblowers
(Singh 2014). In India’s Tianjin Province, more than 50 %
of governmental officials that were prosecuted for abusing
public power in 2011 were based on the information pro-
vided by whistleblowers (Wendy et al. 2011), while the
majority of such cases within the Guizhou Province were
based on the information provided by whistleblowers
(Wendy et al. 2011). Evidently, India as adopted the ethos
of this strategy in the Firm Law 2006 and in the Code of
Corporate Governance for Listed Firms in China 2002.
Article 5 of the Company Law 2006 states that ‘‘a company
shall comply with the laws and administrative regulations,
social morality and business morality. It shall act in good
faith, accept the supervision of the government and the
general public, and bear social responsibilities’’.15 The
Code essentially requires listed firms in China place
stakeholder interests at the core of their strategies. Articles
82 and 83 of this Code state that a ‘‘listed firm shall
actively cooperate with its stakeholders’’ by providing ‘‘the
necessary means to ensure the legal rights of the stake-
holders’’.16 The pressure from global sourcing firms was
considered a means to make supply firms more account-
able for their non-financial responsibilities. However, as
discussed earlier, global sourcing firms are not committed
to this kind of strategy and do not have any effective
monitoring practices in place to regulate the responsibility
practices of their suppliers.
It is also important to note that meeting the demands of
stakeholders becomes complicated when there is a pow-
erful nexus of groups with vested interests. As considered
by Islam and Deegan (2008), the findings of this article
suggest that international buyers drive practices within the
RMG industry, not industry owners, RMG workers, the
public sector, NGOs, civil society organizations, the local
community or the natural environment. This has meant that
the needs of some stakeholders have been valued over
14 It has been reported that the Standing Committee for Law and
Justice Affairs of the Parliament of Bangladesh is considering draft
legislation, namely, the Public Interest Related Information Disclo-
sure (Protection) Act 2010 that contains whistleblower related
provisions. Bangladesh is a party to the United Nations Convention
against Corruption, 2007 and the rate of corruption at the corporate
level of this country is one of the highest in the world. It is hoped this
legislation (if it is passed) would be an important strategy to fight
against corruption. For details, see Correspondent (2010).
15 Article 5 of the Firms Law 2006 of China (emphasis added).
16 Article 82 and 83 of the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed
Firms in China 2002. For a detailed discussion, see Lin (2007).
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others, and garment workers, local communities in prox-
imity to the industry and the natural environment have been
systematically neglected. Consequently, it is necessary to
identify key stakeholders and address their concerns if the
industry is to be sustainable and socially responsible. In
particular, employees in the RMG industry, who make up
the largest collective stakeholder group as well as creating
the product that generates the industry’s revenue, have
been overlooked and ignored. This is in line with prior
research, which has suggested that the RMG industry in
Bangladesh is visibly banking on the ‘‘vulnerabilities of a
highly labour-intensive and poor country as their source of
profit’’ (Rahim 2012b, pp. 105–106). To counteract this, a
NG approach in laws can allow for the engagement of all
stakeholder groups and other sub-systems by regulating of
socio-economic issues within an industry. This approach
will be most effective when engagement is used in con-
junction with other regulation strategies, rather than as a
stand-alone approach. Therefore, the best outcome will be
dependent on the ability of different actors and the level of
agreement between different modes in social responsibility
practices (Kruse 2006). This is vital in transcending the
self-interest of firms to achieve the common good (Palazzo
and Richter 2005, p. 396).
The core of NG is that it consists of substantive and
procedural values derived from a plurality of regulation
originating in the state, and it encourages different actors
and factors to cooperate in implementing regulation
strategies to reach an objective (Karkkainen 2004; Lobel
2004; Salamon 2000). Adopting these NG approach sig-
nifies an attempt to create stronger, more nuanced rela-
tionships between law and other sub-systems which are
underpinned by the autonomous processes of adjustment,
representation and participation. Including this approach
can channel external pressure, including pressure from
local groups, to the firms concerned. Further, this can
provide scope to stakeholders to assess firms’ internal
programs, and can link incentive schemes for the cham-
pion and legal sanctions for the laggard (Gunningham
1995; King and Lenox 2000; Rahim 2011b). To this end,
political consensus and the involvement of the state are
both necessary as they can determine the extent of cor-
porate and stakeholders’ rights and liabilities through laws
and set public policy goals for industry (Rasche and Esser
2006).
Conclusion
To guarantee the CSR of the RMG industry in developing
counties, this article has argued that a NG approach should
be employed to reform the laws related to social respon-
sibility practices of the global suppliers in these countries.
If implemented, this legal approach would ensure that
incidents such as the Rana Plaza tragedy do not eventuate.
The key contributions of the NG approach in law are
that it empowers a mostly disempowered group of stake-
holders in the GSC. Business ethics are held to ransom
when an internationally dispersed supply chain is able to
operate in developing countries such as Bangladesh where,
as argued in this paper, actors such as government (who are
purported to act in the public interest) can be susceptible to
corruption and endorsing lax standards that are favourable
to the concerns of multi-national enterprise. Despite the
potential for mechanisms such as social auditing to
improve transparency and the discharge of accountability
to workers in developing countries, this paper illustrated
the shortcomings in these processes and how they were
unable to meet their intended purpose. Current forms of
regulation in most of the developing countries are unable to
address these concerns because the approach in them are
mostly ‘prescriptive’ which limits regulation to a set of
activities and do not create enough scopes for non-gov-
ernmental actors to effectively contribute in regulation.
The NG approach to law offers a viable alternative to
infuse more ethical responsibility, transparency and
accountability in export-oriented industries. It does so by
integrating self-regulation and uplifting concern from the
grassroots, for example, through whistleblower policies as
discussed at the end part of this paper. These will assist in
balancing the dominant concerns of global suppliers in
developing countries.
The success of integrating NG approach in law
accordingly is dependent upon the commitment of global
buying firms, political consensus and the involvement of
the government. Thus, this integration requires a holistic
approach to implementation. The role of the government in
such implementation is to set the policy goals of social
responsibility practices and to act as a facilitator in
achieving these goals with the assistance of other stake-
holders. This is particularly relevant for Bangladesh, with
its inadequate engagement of public and high corruption
prevalence. The need for laws with a NG approach that
depends on a combination of different forces, rather than
primarily relying on command and control type regulations
and market-based rationales, has therefore become
apparent.
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